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A B S T R A C T
Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) developed a Virtual Gas Stove Checking paradigm. They demonstrated that
repeated checking resulted in lower confidence and reduced the vividness and detail of recollections. Over the
past decades, many experiments have used (an adaptation of) this experimental paradigm to study phenomena
related to obsessive compulsive disorders (OCD). The first aim of the present study was to conduct a meta-
analysis of experiments (k = 28; N = 1662) on the repeated checking paradigm. Repeated checking was found
to have large effects on decreases in memory confidence, vividness and detail. Unexpectedly, repeated checking
also produced small reductions in memory accuracy. The second aim of the present study was to develop an
improved version of the checking paradigm in which 1) stimuli presentations were fully balanced; and 2) the
checking latency was comparable across stimuli in order to 3) assess actual checking behavior. The improved
version (Virtual checking task 2.0) replicated earlier findings on meta-memory.
1. General introduction
Although obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a heterogeneous
disorder, there are two prominent features: 1) patients tend to be un-
certain about cognitive functions like memory (“did I really shut the
door?”; Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003; MacDonald,
Antony, McLeod & Richter, 1997; Dar, Rish, Hermesh, Taub, & Fux,
2000; Hermans et al., 2008), and 2) around 80% patients engage in
repetitive checking (Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010). Patients ty-
pically maintain that checking serves to reduce or prevent cognitive
uncertainty (Tallis, 1995). Around the turn of the century, several au-
thors suggested that although repetitive checking may indeed be mo-
tivated by the wish to reduce uncertainty, it paradoxically increases
rather than reduces uncertainty about checked issues (Rachman, 2002;
Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002; Tolin et al., 2001; van den Hout & Kindt,
2003a). In their 2003a paper, van den Hout and Kindt reported three
experiments that critically tested this hypothesis. Healthy volunteers
engaged in a virtual gas stove checking task and were asked to turn on,
turn off and check 3 out of 6 gas rings by turning corresponding knobs
with a computer mouse. After a first checking trial (the pre-test), par-
ticipants were tested for memory accuracy (which rings did you have to
check?) and rated their confidence in the memory accuracy, as well as
the vividness and detail of their memory. Ratings were scored on visual
analogue scales (VASes). Subsequently, half of the participants (i.e.,
relevant checking group) this process with various configurations of the
gas rings. After the twentieth trial, they completed a post-test, which
was identical to the pre-test. The other half of the group (i.e., irrelevant
checking group) performed the same pre-test and post-test with the gas
rings, however irrelevant stimuli (i.e., virtual light bulbs) were dis-
played instead of gas rings. Accuracy was good at pre-test and remained
so at post-test in both conditions. Moreover, in line with the hypothesis,
scores on memory confidence, vividness and detail dropped sub-
stantially in the relevant checking condition, whereas no such effect
occurred in the irrelevant checking condition. This points to a psy-
chological cascade that helps to understand the maintenance of com-
pulsive checking. The authors argued that the repetition of the gas ring
checking increased the familiarity of the checked stimuli, rendering the
checking an automatic routine. The latter implies a reduction in per-
ceptual processing, culminating in reduced ratings for confidence, vi-
vidness, and detail at post-test. In the irrelevant checking group, the
post-test stimuli were relatively new, explaining why no such effects
were observed here. Therefore, uncertainty may promote checking, yet
checking backfires and may ironically serve to enhance uncertainty.
The virtual checking task provides an experimental model of the
effects of perseverative, OCD-like checking. The original publication
(van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) was relatively well-cited and the task
was used in several laboratories. The first aim of the present paper was
to evaluate the robustness of the task effects by undertaking a brief
meta-analysis. There is another aim. The checking paradigm as de-
scribed above has at least three shortcomings that call for an improved
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version. First, the crucial dependent variables (memory confidence for
the last check and the vividness and detail of the recollection) are self-
reports, rated on VASes. While, arguably, self-reports are appropriate to
study experiential phenomena of the present type (van den Hout,
Engelhard, & McNally, 2017), these are silent about actual behavior
and processes that cannot be assessed via self-report. For instance, it has
been suggested (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) that, as checking con-
tinues, it becomes automated. If so, with the repetition it should gra-
dually take less effort, which should surface in faster checking. Ideally
then, the paradigm should monitor participants’ actual checking
behavior, to enable testing for whether checking automatization really
occurs. In addition, researchers could study other behavioral para-
meters, such as the numbers and types of errors occurring or sponta-
neous re-checking. The original paradigm does not allow for this and a
new, upgraded version should. Second, condition and stimulus-materials
were confounded and unbalanced in the original paradigm. The ex-
periment has three phases: pre-test→ repeated checking→ post-test. In
the relevant checking condition, the stimuli were Gas rings→ Gas
rings→ Gas rings. In the irrelevant checking condition, the stimuli were
Gas rings→ Light bulbs→ Gas rings. To have a properly balanced
Fig. 1. Forest plot of the effect sizes (Hedges's g) for all studies reporting a Time (pre- vs. post-test) x Revelance (relevant vs. irrelevant checking) interaction on the outcome variables (a)
accuracy, (b) confidence, (c) vividness and (d) detail, using a random effects model. CI = confidence interval. Subscripts denote how the reported studies differ from the original design
(cf. van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a); a = within subjects design instead of a mixed design; b1 = OCD patients instead of healthy subjects, b2 combination of OCD and healthy subjects; c =
non-virtual checking instead of virtual checking; d = fully balanced design instead of a partially balanced design; the subscript e denotes the use of different stimuli that gas rings vs. light
bulbs, with e1 = stove vs. sink, e2 = colored plates vs. colored bowls, e3 = large green circles vs. small grey circles, e4 = large circles with star vs. small grey circles; the subscript f
indicates the use of a different number of trials than 20, with f1 = 14 trials and f2 = 15 trials (Boschen et al., 2011; Giele et al., 2014; Linkovski et al., 2013; Medway and Jones,
2013; Radomsky et al., 2006; Radomsky et al., 2014; Toffolo et al., 2016; van den Hout and Kindt, 2003b; van den, 2016).
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paradigm, there should be another relevant checking and another ir-
relevant checking condition. The relevant checking being: Light bulbs→
Light bulbs→ Light bulbs and the other irrelevant checking condition
being: Light bulbs→ Gas rings→ Light bulbs. It may be noted that in
two previous experiments, the gas rings and light bulbs were replaced
by abstract objects (circles with different sizes and colors), and the
design was fully balanced/not confounded. These experiments yielded
the same meta-memory effects: drops in confidence, vividness, and
detail in the relevant checking conditions, but not in the irrelevant
conditions (Dek, van den Hout, Giele & Engelhard, 2010). A new
program for the virtual checking experiment should by default use the
fully balanced design. As a third shortcoming, it was assumed that both
tasks (handling gas rings vs. light bulbs) needed comparable effort to
carry out and that any minor differences would not affect the meta-
memory discussed above: confidence, vividness, and detail. This should
be evident from a) comparable response latencies developing in and
across the task trials, and b) identical patterns of meta-memory data for
the two tasks. However, the paradigm did not allow for verification of
this assumption. Given that the phenomenon at hand is believed to
result from automatization, it is particularly important (1) that the tasks
Vividness
(c)
Hedges’s g p-value Sample Size
Study Name Relevant Irrelevant
Boschen & Vuksanovic (2007, Study 1a) 0.719 0.058 14 14
Boschen & Vuksanovic (2007, Study 1b) 2.112 0.000 39 39
Boschen, Wilson & Farrell (2011) 0.473 0.124 20 22
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2010, Study 1) 1.266 0.000 45 45
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2010, Study 2) 0.531 0.032 33 33
Dek, van den Hout, Giele & Engelhard (2014a) 0.723 0.006 30 29
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2014b, Study 1a) 0.427 0.235 15 15
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2014b, Study 1b) 0.595 0.097 16 15
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2015, Study 1) 0.519 0.031 37 33
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2015, Study 2) 1.170 0.000 36 36
Fowle & Boschen (2011) 0.201 0.432 30 30
Linkovski, Kalanthroff, Henik & Anholt (2013) 0.991 0.002 42 13
Medway & Jones (2013) 1.121 0.000 57 57
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 1a) 0.452 0.210 15 15
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 1b) 1.211 0.002 15 15
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 2) 1.456 0.000 15 15
Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) 0.651 0.023 25 25
Toffolo, van den Hout, Radomsky & Engelhard (2016, Study 1) 0.424 0.100 30 30
Toffolo, van den Hout, Radomsky & Engelhard (2016, Study 2) 0.770 0.018 20 19
van den Hout & Kindt (2003a, Study 1) 1.421 0.000 19 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2003a, Study 2) 1.556 0.000 20 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2003b) 1.113 0.001 20 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2004, Study 5) 1.299 0.000 20 20
van den Hout, van Dis, van Woudenberg & van de Groep (2017, Study 1) 1.078 0.000 41 47
van Dis & van den Hout (2016, Study 1) 1.223 0.000 24 24
van Dis & van den Hout (2016, Study 2) 0.667 0.015 28 27
van Woudenberg (2017, Unpublished manuscript) 0.531 0.018 41 40
Pooled effect size 0.902 0.000
Hedges’s g (95%CI)
-3.0 -1.5 0 1.5 3.0
Detail
(d)
Hedges’s g p-value Sample size
Study name Relevant Irrelevant
Boschen & Vuksanovic (2007, Study 1a) 0.735 0.053 14 14
Boschen & Vuksanovic (2007, Study 1b) 2.098 0.000 39 39
Boschen, Wilson & Farrell (2011) 0.558 0.071 20 22
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2010, Study 1) 1.352 0.000 45 45
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2010, Study 2) 0.622 0.013 33 33
Dek, van den Hout, Giele & Engelhard (2014a) 0.822 0.002 30 29
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2014b, Study 1a) 0.517 0.152 15 15
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2014b, Study 1b) 0.574 0.108 16 15
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2015, Study 1) 0.493 0.040 37 33
Dek, van den Hout, Engelhard & Giele (2015, Study 2) 1.115 0.000 36 36
Fowle & Boschen (2011) 0.363 0.158 30 30
Linkovski, Kalanthroff, Henik & Anholt (2013) 0.789 0.014 42 13
Medway & Jones (2013) 1.149 0.000 57 57
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 1a) 0.938 0.012 15 15
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 1b) 0.973 0.010 15 15
Radomsky, Dugas, Alcolado & Lavoie (2014, Study 2) 1.638 0.000 15 15
Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault (2006) 0.691 0.016 25 25
Toffolo, van den Hout, Radomsky & Engelhard (2016, Study 1) 0.083 0.744 30 30
Toffolo, van den Hout, Radomsky & Engelhard (2016, Study 2) 1.014 0.002 20 19
van den Hout & Kindt (2003a, Study 1) 1.078 0.001 19 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2003a, Study 2) 1.046 0.002 20 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2003b) 0.720 0.025 20 20
van den Hout & Kindt (2004, Study 5) 1.330 0.000 20 20
van den Hout, van Dis, van Woudenberg & van de Groep (2017, Study 1) 0.755 0.001 41 47
van Dis & van den Hout (2016, Study 1) 1.253 0.000 24 24
van Dis & van den Hout (2016, Study 2) 0.642 0.019 28 27
van Woudenberg (2017, Unpublished manuscript) 0.553 0.014 41 40
Pooled effect size 0.872 0.000
Hedges’s g (95%CI)
-3.0 -1.5 0 1.5 3.0
Fig. 1. (continued)
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are comparable in the amount of effort it takes to complete them and
(2) to show the trial-by-trial development of the hypothetical auto-
matization for both tasks. In short, then, the first aim of the present
paper was to provide a meta-analytic overview of the published
checking-paradigm studies. The second aim was to develop an adapted
version of the paradigm to overcome the aforementioned problems: (1)
it should assess actual checking behavior, (2) stimuli should be fully
balanced, and (3) the experimental tasks should be comparable in terms
of effort, measured in response latency over the various trials, while any
minor differences would be immaterial to the cognitive measures.
2. Meta-analysis
2.1. Literature search
Relevant studies (published until June 9, 2017) were identified by
systematically searching several electronical databases (i.e., PsychInfo,
Pubmed, Embase and OpenGrey). Our search strategies included a
combination of the terms memory, repeat*, persever* and check* (see
Appendix A for exact search strategies). The electronic database search
was supplemented by examining all papers that cited the original van
den Hout & Kindt (2003a) study. We knew of one unpublished study
from our laboratory and added this study to the meta-analysis as well.
2.1.1. Inclusion criteria
Studies were selected if they included: (1) (an adapted version of)
the repeated checking task first described by van den Hout & Kindt
(2003a); (2) (at least) one data point before and after the intervention
(i.e., pre-test and post-test); (3) a direct comparison between repeated
relevant checking and irrelevant checking. We also included studies
with minor adaptations to the original design, such as (1) within-sub-
ject design instead of a mixed design, (2) inclusion of (both healthy
controls and) OCD patients, (3) non-virtual checking instead of virtual
checking, (4) a fully balanced design instead of a partially balanced
design, (5) different stimuli and (6) different number of trials. For a
more detailed description and overview of the adaptations for each
included study, see Fig. 1.
2.1.2. Study selection
The search strategy, combined with the additional citation search,
resulted in 364 unique articles which were independently screened by
title and abstract by IG and ED using Covidence systematic review
software (available at www.covidence.org). Disagreements (k = 1)
were resolved through discussion. Of these articles, 44 full-texts were
further assessed for eligibility. If the reported data were insufficient for
effect size calculation, authors were contacted by IG and requested to
provide the missing information (k = 5, response rate = 80%). In total,
19 articles were included, reporting 28 studies. All these studies were
conducted on different samples of subjects, so the assumption of in-
dependence (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) has presumably not been violated
in our analysis.
2.1.3. Outcomes
The primary outcomes were the accuracy, confidence, vividness,
and detail of ratings related to the participant's recollection of the last
checking operation. We only considered interaction effects between
Condition (Relevant vs. Irrelevant) × Time (Pre- vs. Post-test) for these
outcome measures (corresponding means, standard deviations, p-va-
lues, F-tests, t-tests, or estimates of effect sizes). Studies that only re-
ported accuracy in counts (i.e., number of mistakes made at test) rather
than the Condition × Time interaction were excluded from analyses on
accuracy. Reliable estimates of pre-post correlations are crucial
(Cuijpers, Weitz, Cristea, & Twisk, 2016), hence we estimated these for
each outcome measure based on data of eleven studies: accuracy: r =
.089, p = .054; confidence: r = .205, p< .001; vividness: r = .280,
p< .001; detail: r = .382, p< .001 (van den Hout & Kindt, 2004
[Study 5]; Boschen & Vuksanovic, 2007; Dek, van den Hout, Giele &
Engelhard, 2010 [Study 1 and 2]; Dek, van den Hout, Giele &
Engelhard, 2014a, 2014b [Study 1 and 2]; Dek, van den Hout,
Engelhard, & Giele, Cath, 2015; van Dis & van den Hout, 2016 [Study 1
and 2], and the data reported below).
2.1.4. Data analysis
All analyses were conducted using the Comprehensive Meta-ana-
lysis software (Version 3.3.070), using a random effects model. Hedges’
g was used for effect size estimation, given its ability to control for
variations in sample sizes between studies (Borenstein, Hedges,
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). We used the I2 statistic as indicator of
heterogeneity, which displays the proportion of the observed variance
reflecting variance in true effect sizes rather than sampling error
(Borenstein et al., 2009). I2 ranges from 0% to 100%, where low values
mean that most of the dispersion of effects would disappear if the
sampling error could be removed (and vice versa, high values mean that
most of the observed dispersion would remain; Borenstein, Higgins,
Hedges, & Rothstein, 2017). Besides the I2 statistic, we also calculated
prediction intervals to estimate the absolute range of effects across
populations for each outcome measure (see Borenstein et al., 2017).
Risk of publication bias was tested using Egger's test (one-tailed; Egger,
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997). In addition, we assessed risk of
publication bias through trim and fill technique (Duval & Tweedie,
2000), which is a funnel-plot-based technique of testing and adjusting
for publication bias.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Memory accuracy, confidence, vividness, and detail
On memory accuracy, 17 studies (N = 1112; 63 OCD patients) re-
ported an interaction effect between Condition (relevant vs. irrelevant
checking) and Time (pre- vs. posttest). As can be seen in Fig. 1a, these
studies demonstrated that repeated checking has a small effect on
memory accuracy, g = .341, 95% CI [.212, .469]. For memory con-
fidence, we pooled effects of 28 studies (N = 1622; 93 OCD patients)
demonstrating that repeated checking has a large effect on memory
confidence, g = .887, 95% CI [.720, 1.054] (Fig. 1b). A similar, large
effect of repeated checking was observed on memory vividness (27
studies, N = 1568; 93 OCD patients), g = .902, 95% CI [.733, 1.071]
(see Fig. 1c), and on detail (27 studies, N = 1568; 93 OCD patients), g
= .872, 95% CI [.709, 1.034] (see Fig. 1d).
2.2.2. Sensitivity analyses
We conducted a sensitivity analysis for each outcome, to assess the
robustness of our results. For each outcome, we repeatedly calculated
the pooled effect size while leaving out one study, to see whether one
study strongly influenced the pooled effect. These analyses showed that
the effect size did not fundamentally change for any of the outcome
measures, proving the robustness of our results. When leaving out the
most extreme study, the effect size of Confidence (.887) either changed
to .836 or .912; Vividness (.902) to .848 or .932; Detail (.872) to .817 or
.905; and Accuracy (.341) to .317 or .358.
2.2.3. Publication bias
Egger's test of the intercept suggests there is no publication bias for
accuracy, t(15)< 1, p = .405, confidence, t(26)< 1, p = .247, vivid-
ness, t(25)< 1, p = .266, and detail, t(25)< 1, p = .264. Duval and
Tweedie's trim and fill procedure revealed that no studies had to be
imputed for any of the outcome variables. Hence, both tests indicate
there is a low risk of publication bias for all outcome measures. Fig. C1
shows the funnel plots with standard error by Hedges’ g for all outcome
measures (see Appendix C).
2.2.4. Test for heterogeneity
Our results indicated that heterogeneity for memory accuracy was
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probably small, I2 = .00. Estimates of absolute variation indicate that
the estimated effect of accuracy (Hedges’ g) may vary across popula-
tions from .202 to .480 (i.e., prediction interval). For memory con-
fidence, vividness, and detail heterogeneity may be moderate, with I2
= 58.29, I2 = 57.89, and I2 = 54.72 respectively. The prediction in-
tervals range from .171 to 1.603 for confidence; from .187 to 1.617 for
vividness and .205–1.539 for detail. As we did not pre-specify any
subgroup differences in advance, we decided not to further investigate
explanations for heterogeneity (see Higgins & Green, 2011), but added
an explorative analysis of heterogeneity in different subgroups in
Appendix C.
2.3. Discussion meta-analysis
The meta-analysis demonstrated the meta-memory findings are ro-
bust. Relative to irrelevant checking, relevant checking induced large
and reliable drops in memory confidence, vividness, and detail.
Moreover, the meta-analysis revealed a small decline in accuracy in the
relevant checking condition in comparison to the irrelevant checking
condition. Interestingly, such an effect was not detected in most of the
individual studies we reviewed. In the general discussion, we will ela-
borate on this discrepancy and provide a critical discussion of the main
findings.
3. Virtual checking task 2.0
3.1. Introduction
The aim was to improve the original task by allowing for assess-
ment, trial by trial, of the nature and timing of the behavioral re-
sponses. In both the original and the present version of the paradigm,
there were two stimulus conditions: virtual gas rings and virtual light
bulbs. We wanted the response latencies for both stimuli, and their
development over time, to be comparable. We attempted to reach this
equivalence by small variations in the display of the rings/bulbs and in
the way participants could interact with the rings/lights. Pilot experi-
ments proved latency-equivalence for the two tasks to be a sensitive
issue: minor variations made latencies for one of the two tasks condi-
tions slower or faster than the other. However, in line with the results
from the meta-analysis given above, the paradigm proved robust: de-
spite between-task differences in latencies, decreases in vividness, de-
tail and confidence occurred in the relevant checking condition, relative
to the irrelevant checking condition. Based on these pilots, we settled
for the paradigm that is described below.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Participants
The study sample included 88 students who were recruited at
Utrecht University from June to December 2016 (M age = 22, SD =
2.7, 63 females). Participants were remunerated by course credits or
small financial reward and all provided written informed consent prior
to participation.
3.2.2. Task
Participants performed an adapted version of the virtual checking
task (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) programmed in Matlab, R2015b,
which has been made available online (see Supplementary Material).
The computer task included a virtual six-burner stove and a set of six
light bulbs that participants could turn on and off using the computer
mouse (see Fig. 2). Each trial started with a 4 s (s) presentation of a
schematic diagram that presented three random screen positions of gas
rings or light bulbs that needed to be turned on. After turning on the gas
rings or light bulbs, participants were asked to turn off these stimuli and
finally to check whether they were turned off correctly. The task took
about 15 min to complete.
3.2.3. Procedure
Participants practised with one gas ring and one light bulb trial, and
then continued with the first trial (either a gas ring or light bulb trial).
After the first trial, participants filled out the questions about memory
accuracy, confidence, vividness and detail of that first checking trial
(i.e., pre-test). Next, participants performed 20 checking trials that were
either all similar to the first trial (i.e., relevant checking group) or
different from the first trial (i.e., irrelevant checking group). After the
20 checking trials, participants performed the post-test, using the same
stimulus type they encountered earlier in the pre-test, and subsequently
rated memory accuracy, confidence, vividness and detail of that final
checking bout. Importantly, the stimulus types were fully balanced
across conditions. Therefore, participants in the relevant checking
condition were either (1) checking gas rings during all phases (GGG) or
(2) checking light bulbs during all phases (LLL). In contrast, partici-
pants in the irrelevant checking condition were either (1) checking the
gas rings in the pre-and post-test, and the light bulbs during the
checking trials (GLG) or (2) checking the light bulbs during the pre-and
post-test, and the gas rings during the checking trials (LGL).
3.2.4. Assessments
3.2.4.1. Accuracy. During the pre- and post-test, participants were
presented with a schematic depiction of either six gas rings or light
bulbs and asked to indicate which gas rings or light bulbs they had been
instructed to turn on. In previous studies authors had assessed accuracy
by comparing the items to be checked with the participants’
recollection (i.e., “subjective accuracy”). Any mismatch between the
instruction (e.g., “Check gas rings 2, 4 and 6″) and self-reported checks
(e.g., a participant indicated having checked gas rings 2, 4 and 5) was
considered as inaccurate subjective accuracy (dichotomous variable).
The present paradigm also allowed for assessing whether the items
included in the instruction were actually the ones that were checked
(i.e., “objective accuracy”). Any mismatch between the instruction
(e.g., “Check gas rings 2, 4 and 6″) and actual checks (e.g., a participant
checked gas rings 2, 4 and 5) was considered as inaccurate objective
accuracy (dichotomous variable).
3.2.4.2. Memory confidence, vividness and detail. Participants were
asked to indicate on a VAS (ranging from 0 = absolutely not confident
to 100 = absolutely confident) how confident they were that they
answered the accuracy question correctly. Moreover, they were asked
to rate the vividness and detail of their recollection of the last checking
trial they performed on two VASes, ranging from 0= not vivid to 100 =
extremely vivid, and 0 = not detailed to 100 = extremely detailed,
respectively.
3.3. Results
3.3.1. Memory effects: accuracy, confidence, vividness and detail
In terms of accuracy, Table 1 demonstrates that participants were
relatively accurate in remembering which items they were supposed to
check, with subjective accuracy scores of around 85%. In contrast,
objective accuracy was lower, with accuracy scores ranging from 41%
to 46%. Two separate 2 × 2 × 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVAs)
with Time (pre-test vs. post-test) as the within group factor, and Re-
levance (relevant checking vs. irrelevant checking) and Stimulus (gas
vs. lights) as between group factors, tested whether repeated checking
affected self-reported and behavioral accuracy over time. Both ANOVAs
showed no Time × Relevance × Stimulus interaction effects for sub-
jective accuracy, F(1, 84)< 1, p = .537, ηp2 = .01, and objective ac-
curacy, F(1, 84) = 1.09, p = .300, ηp2 = .01, nor for Time × Re-
levance, F(1, 86) = 2.86, p = .094, ηp2 = .03 and F(1, 86) = 1.81, p =
.182, ηp2 = .02, respectively.
The VAS scores on memory confidence, detail and vividness were
analyzed by three separate 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVAs with Time (pre-
test vs. post-test) as the within group factor, and Relevance (relevant
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checking vs. irrelevant checking) and Stimulus (gas vs. lights) as be-
tween group factors. In terms of confidence, Fig. 3 (left panel) clearly
shows that irrespective of stimulus type, confidence decreased only
after relevant checking, and not after irrelevant checking. In line with
this observation, the overall interaction between Time × Relevance ×
Stimulus was not statistically significant, F(1, 84)< 1, p = .767, ηp2 =
.00, yet crucially, we found a strong Time × Relevance interaction, F(1,
86) = 33.50, p< .001, ηp2 = .28, reflecting a decrease in confidence in
the relevant checking group, t(40) = 7.35, p< .001, while no differ-
ence over time was found in the irrelevant checking group, t(46)< 1, p
= .743. The effects on vividness were completely consonant with the
findings on confidence (see Fig. 3, central panel). Again, the Time ×
Relevance × Stimulus was not statistically significant, F(1, 84)< 1, p
= .501, ηp2 = .00, while we found again a strong Time × Relevance
interaction, F(1, 86) = 27.90, p< .001, ηp2 = .25. In line with our
expectations, vividness ratings decreased over time after relevant
checking, t(40) = 6.45, p< .001, but did not change over time after
irrelevant checking, t(46)< 1, p = .961. In terms of detail, there were
similar patterns (see Fig. 3, right panel). The Time × Relevance ×
Stimulus interaction was again not statistically significant, F(1, 84)< 1,
p = .833, ηp2 = .00, in contrast to the Time × Relevance interaction, F
(1, 86) = 15.96, p< .001, ηp2 = .16. The relevant checkers reported a
decrease in memory detail over time, t(40) = 3.91, p< .001, while the
detail ratings did not change over time for irrelevant checkers, t(46) =
1.41, p = .166.
3.3.2. Latency
The response latencies and their development over time are dis-
played in Fig. 4 for both the gas-checking and light bulb checking
conditions. Response latencies were subjected to a 20 × 2 × 2 mixed
ANOVA comparing Time (checking trials 1–20) as within group factor,
while Relevance (relevant checking vs. irrelevant checking) and Sti-
mulus (gas rings vs. light bulbs) served as between group factors. The
sphericity assumption was violated for Time, hence we used Green-
house-Geisser corrections. Fig. 4 shows considerable speeding up over
trials, which was reflected in a significant main effect for Time F(11.41,
958.29) = 37.62, p< .001, ηp2 = .31. Further trend analyses showed
that the effect of Time followed a linear, F(1, 84) = 231.81, p< .001,
ηp2 = .73, and quadratic trend, F(1, 84) = 85.38, p< .001, ηp2 = .50.
In addition, Fig. 4 seems to suggest differences between stimuli: overall,
responses to gas stimuli tended to be faster than to lights. Indeed, there
was a significant main effect of Stimulus, F(1, 84) = 5.61, p= .020, ηp2
Fig. 2. Experimental stimuli of the adapted virtual
checking task included a) gas rings and b) light
bulbs.
Table 1
Percentage of participants that accurately reported or behaved conform instruction.
Relevant Irrelevant
Subjective Pre 88% 85%
Post 78% 94%
Objective Pre 46% 43%
Post 41% 45%
Fig. 3. Reported memory confidence, vividness and detail before and after repeated checking. LLL = light bulb trials during pre, checking, post; LGL = light bulb trials during pre and


















Fig. 4. Total duration (in ms) per checking trial (i.e., turning on, off and checking) for 20
checks.
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= .06. Furthermore, the development over time was comparable with
the two stimuli: there was no interaction of Time × Stimulus, F(11.41,
958.29)< 1, p = .409, ηp2 = .01, nor of Time × Stimulus × Condi-
tion, F(19, 86)< 1, p = .759, ηp2 = .01.
3.4. Discussion virtual checking task 2.0
The current experiment used an updated version of the virtual
checking task and found similar results. That is, compared to irrelevant
checking, relevant checking induced decreases in memory confidence,
vividness and detail. We found no effects of relevant checking on ac-
curacy. Nevertheless, the study revealed unanticipated differences be-
tween “subjective accuracy” (i.e., match/mismatches between in-
structed responses and remembered responses) and ‘objective accuracy”
(i.e., match/mismatches between actual responses and remembered
responses). Participants were considerably more accurate on subjective
accuracy than on objective accuracy. Interestingly, we also found that
checking latencies reduced over time (irrespective of condition), with a
strong acceleration in the beginning, leveling off after about 10 trials.
Our results are in line with earlier findings obtained from an ex-
perimental design that was not fully balanced and, strictly speaking,
contained, an experimental confound (see introduction). Likewise,
earlier versions of the task did not match the conditions in terms of
effort needed to complete the task, nor allowed for the assessment of
actual behavior: speed of responding on the various trials and dis-
crepancies between actual and remembered responses. In our updated
checking task, the confound was removed and the tasks were highly
comparable in terms of effort (for a critical and more detailed account,
see general discussion).
Given the similarity between previous findings and the results of our
present study, it is extremely unlikely that earlier findings were affected
by the limited balancing/confound. Likewise, our replication of earlier
findings makes it unlikely that these previous results were affected by
between-condition differences in required effort. It should be noted that
we were unable to develop tasks that were exactly similar in terms of
required effort, as measured by response latencies. However, there was
no indication that differences in experimental load affected the results.
4. General discussion
We aimed to evaluate the robustness of an experimental model of
compulsive checking by conducting a meta-analysis of published stu-
dies. We also intended to improve the paradigm by (1) overcoming a
potential confound in the earlier version, (2) adding behavioral as-
sessments to complement the self-reports used earlier and (3) rendering
the two paradigm tasks comparable in terms of response latencies.
4.1. Meta-analysis
The meta-analysis yielded clear results. Scores dropped reliably in
the experimental condition on the variables of primary interest (con-
fidence, vividness and detail) relative to the control condition of irre-
levant checking, with effect sizes exceeding g= .875. The study designs
were highly comparable with deviations in terms of characteristics of
the participants, number of trials, nature of the stimuli being too in-
frequent to allow for statistical comparisons (however, see Appendix B
for explorative subgroup comparisons).
For reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, data collected on
accuracy in the various papers (see also 3.3.1) are hard to handle sta-
tistically. Researchers have chosen different options, including just
presenting the numbers (with no testing for statistical significance) or
testing it statistically with a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA. We pooled these
interaction effects and unexpectedly found a small effect for repeated
checking on memory accuracy, indicating that repeated checking
slightly reduced memory accuracy. Note that almost all individual
studies did not find an accuracy effect, illustrating the importance of
conducting a meta-analysis, given that individual studies are often
underpowered to detect small effects (Borenstein et al., 2009). Given
that the pooled effect of repeated checking on accuracy is small, we
deem it unlikely that the large effects of repeated checking on memory
confidence, vividness and detail were driven by the effect on accuracy
(for a detailed explanation and discussion, see Section 4.3).
4.2. Virtual checking task 2.0
As explained in the introduction, earlier versions of the task con-
tained a confound, where relevant checking was being carried out with
the gas stove, but not with the light bulbs. Some studies lacked this
confound (Dek, van den Hout, Giele, & Engelhard, 2010; Dek et al.,
2014a, 2014b; Fowle & Boschen, 2011) yet still found the crucial in-
teraction. The present study likewise was fully balanced, with relevant
and irrelevant checking both being carried out with both sets of stimuli.
As reflected by Fig. 3, there were strong and reliable drops in vividness,
detail and confidence due to relevant checking, but no such drops oc-
curred in the irrelevant checking control conditions. There were no
effects of stimulus type (see Fig. 3), replicating earlier effects (Dek
et al., 2014a, 2014b; Dek et al., 2010; Fowle & Boschen, 2011), in-
dicating that the confound was immaterial to the effects previously
observed and summarized in Fig. 1.
A further aim was to allow for assessing actual behavior, over and
above self-report. The present paradigm does allow for this now. An
unanticipated observation was the divergence between objective and
subjective accuracy. Apparently, participants were fairly accurate at
indicating which items they were asked to check (i.e., subjective ac-
curacy). In fact, however, while carrying out the checking, participants’
behavior was not always completely in correspondence with the actual
instruction (i.e., objective accuracy). For instance, participants checked
gas rings 1, 2, and 3, while the instruction was to check gas rings 1, 2,
and 5. Subjective accuracy was around 85% on average, while objective
accuracy was considerably lower (around 50%). We can only speculate
as to why this was the case. Possibly, the fact that making errors had no
negative consequences created some performance indifference and be-
havioral accuracy could increase if, for example, financial compensa-
tion for participating were to be made dependent on task performance.
Finally, we wanted the two conditions to be comparable in terms of
effort it takes to complete the trials of the task, operationalized by re-
sponse latencies. This proved extremely hard (see 3.1). Various pilots
with small variations in the displays of the two tasks (light bulbs vs. gas
rings) produced latency differences with one task being carried out
faster or slower. Even the final task, reported here, did not completely
reach this goal: it took participants (a little) more time to complete the
light bulb trials than the gas ring trials (see Fig. 4); this was statistically
significant. Had this, minor, in-equivalence difference had an effect on
the subjective data (accuracy, confidence, vividness, and detail) there
should have been stimulus effects in the ANOVAs presented under
paragraph 3.3.1. No such effect was observed, showing that the slight
latency-differences between the two tasks were irrelevant to the crucial
outcome measures. Likewise, while the inequivalence, visible in Fig. 4,
was reflected in a Condition main effect, the slope of the two lines in
Fig. 4 are identical and there was no interaction effect between Con-
dition and Time on the latency measure.
Although the aim of the study was not to test a particular hypothesis
on OCD, the latency findings given in Fig. 4 warrant some discussion.
The response latencies for both stimuli sped up quickly over the first
few trials, approaching an asymptote after trials 10–15 and following a
quadratic pattern. Apparently, then, the OCD-like perseveration as
modelled in the paradigm, is subject to clear automatization, as sug-
gested previously (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a). Human information
processing, including perception, memory, text comprehension and
reading, elementary reasoning, motor behavior etc. is carried out with
very little effort while the accuracy of these processes is typically taken
for granted. Interestingly, the uncertainty that characterizes OCD
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patients typically relates to the trustworthiness of such automatic rou-
tines: Do I understand the text I am reading/hearing? The light seems
off, but can I trust my eyes? Can I trust my hands not to strangle the
baby? Can I trust the memory of me having closed the door? Im-
portantly, the type of safety behavior employed by many OCD patients
is some sort of repetition, like re-reading texts, staring at light switches
or checking gas rings. Ironically, such repetition serves to promote the
very automaticity that is distrusted (see Fig. 4) and, as indicated by
Fig. 1b and 6, to reduce confidence in memory. Why OCD patients use
repetition, provoking automatization, to combat distrust in automatic
processes is a psychological puzzle requiring further study. The present
paper provided some solutions and new insights, while generating
challenges for new studies. We will end the discussion by summarizing
and discussing these issues.
4.3. Solutions
The repeated checking paradigm previously suffered from some
weaknesses: (1) there was a potential confound, (2) it was unclear
whether the paradigm sub-tasks were equally demanding, and (3) the
paradigm did not allow for assessing behavior. These problems were
solved in the version of the task presented here,. The updated task is
freely available online (see Supplementary Material) to facilitate use of
the task for future research. One important avenue for future research is
to use our updated task in a sample of participants who meet the cri-
teria for OCD, to see whether similar automatization effects could be
obtained.
4.4. New insights
From our findings, we obtained three major insights. The first new
insight concerns the observed effect of memory accuracy in the meta-
analysis. The majority of the studies included in the meta-analysis
found strong effects on meta-memory (confidence, vividness and de-
tail), but not on memory accuracy (only 3/17 found a significant (and
medium) effect). However, when collapsed in the meta- analysis and
with enhanced statistical power, it became clear that repeated checking
does also reduce memory accuracy, with the effect being substantially
smaller than the meta-memory effects. Could reductions in accuracy
and in meta-memory have affected each other? A first option is that
reductions in accuracy may have contributed to reductions in memory
confidence, vividness and detail. With regard to memory confidence,
this may be a plausible explanation for part of the effect. In particular,
when filling out the forced choice accuracy data, individuals may have
sensed that they were making errors, resulting in a diminished level of
confidence in their accuracy ratings. However, it is less clear how re-
duced accuracy may have contributed to reduced vividness and detail as
well. Moreover, the errors, as reported in the studies included in the
meta- analysis, were made by only a minority of participants, making it
unlikely that these individuals were responsible for the robust meta-
memory effects. A second, alternative option is that reduced vividness,
detail and confidence could have an profound effect on accuracy. If this
were true, one would likewise expect robust reductions in accuracy,
which were not observed in our results. In our view, the observed
findings can be more convincingly be explained by repetition-induced
automatization of behavior. Note that repetition-induced automatiza-
tion of behavior reduces the ability to explicitly memory the nature of
the automated behavior (and or its consequences; Schacter, 1987) and
the reduced confidence found in the meta-analysis seems to echo this
effect. Interestingly, the performance on forced choice memory tasks is
much more resistant to the effect of automatization. As such, implicit
memory may remain intact even when explicit memory is reduced or
lost (Schacter, 1987). When repetition and automatization increases,
eventually accuracy may suffer as well. Put differently, automatization
may initially have a negative impact on explicit memory only, reflected
in reduced meta-memory ratings, and later on implicit memory as seen
in the subtle effects on the forced choice assessment of accuracy.
The second new insight concerns the observed discrepancy between
objective and subjective memory accuracy. While participants re-
mained relatively good in indicating which objects they were instructed
to check (subjective accuracy), they were in fact less accurate in
checking the right stimuli (objective accuracy), see Table 1.
Third, our findings confirm the van den Hout & Kindt (2003a) hy-
pothesis that repeated checking renders the behavior an automatic
routine (see slopes of the lines given in Fig. 4). Importantly, our study
expands an earlier study by Dek et al., (2014a, 2014b), by demon-
strating this automatization in a more direct way.
4.5. Challenges
Salkovskis (1998) notes that “OCD patients attempt to monitor
closely and take control over processes that would otherwise operate in
automatic and well-practiced ways”. Echoing this clinical observation,
Soref, Dar, Argov, and Meiran (2008) found in an experimental study
that individuals with OCD traits are less likely to shift from focused
processing to parallel processing. This suggests an OCD-related distrust
in automatic routines. The origin of this distrust is largely obscure,
however the experience of normal automatic routines being un-
trustworthy can be extremely alarming. An OCD patient/psychiatrist
thoughtfully labelled the experience an’emotional illusion’ (Oosterhoff,
2017, personal communication) likening the latter to the optical illu-
sion of lines not running in parallel while in fact they do (see Fig. 5).
One knows the lines are parallel, but this does not change the experi-
ence of the lines sloping down. Likewise, the OC experience of dis-
trusting one's hands in terms of strangling the baby may feel as con-
vincing as seeing the lines sloping down. While the latter illusion may
be irrelevant to ones well- being, the emotional illusion is relevant. Not
trusting the automatic routines, the patient may then try and repeat the
behavior in a controlled, effortful way: re-reading with utmost con-
centration, now while speaking out loud, staring at the doorknob,
trying to increase certainty by telling oneself: “it is really closed, I am
seeing it is closed” and by adding tactile experience (touching the knob)
to the visual and auditory information. If the patient were then to ask
himself whether it is credible that the door is still open, he will kill the
baby etc., the answer would be negative. The overwhelming un-
certainty motivates patients to ask another question that seems related,
but that is fundamentally different: “Is it, ultimately, still possible that
the door is not closed or that I will strangle the baby?” In the final
analysis, the answer here is affirmative. This may provide motivation to
further increase certainty by repeating the act, if possible with even
more concentration and effort. This leads to further research questions:
under what condition are OCD patients uncertain about the effects of
automatic routines? Would the distrust of automatic routines be a
special case of an attenuated access to internal states (Dar, Lazarov, &
Liberman, 2016)? We suggested that, in the realm of their worries, OCD
patients replace the question about probability/credibility by questions
about absolute certainty. This is a clinical impression. Would it survive
Fig. 5. The horizontal lines do not seem to be parallel (Café wall illusion).
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critical tests? Questions about ‘ultimate certainty’ seem intrinsically
uninformative, because the answer will always be negative. Would
helping patients replace this uninformative question by the very in-
formative question about credibility stimulate progress in cognitive
behavioral therapy (CBT)? Would accepting the ‘emotional illusion’ as a
curious phenomenon, and training oneself in not responding to it re-
duce its impact? There is room for fresh research.
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PubMed: 113 hits
(Memory [Title/Abstract] OR “Memory” [MeSH]) AND ((Check* [ Title/Abstract] AND Repeat* [Title/Abstract]) OR (Check* [Title/Abstract]
AND Persever* [Title/Abstract]))
Embase: 214 hits
#1‘memory’/exp OR ‘memory’: ab,ti
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#3‘check*’: ab,ti AND ‘persever*’: ab,ti
#4#2 OR #3 #5#1 AND #4
OpenGrey: 52 hits
check* AND (repeat* OR persever*)
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See Appendix Table B1
Table B1
Explorative subgroup analyses on effects of repeated checking on confidence, vividness and detail.
Confidence Vividness Detail
k g I2 k g I2 k g I2
Overall 28 .887 58.29 27 .902 57.89 27 .872 54.72
Design
Mixed 23 .836 40.33 22 .862 43.80 22 .824 18.58
Within 5 1.082 83.35 5 1.039 81.65 5 1.019 86.34
Participants
Healthy 25 .894 62.21 24 .940 60.46 24 .887 59.17
OCD 3 .817 0 3 .526 0 3 .725 0
Trials
20 21 .980 62.21 20 .987 62.44 20 .949 54.29
Other 7 .625 0 7 .679 0 7 .655 43.25
Stimuli
Gas vs. lights 14 .989 71.5 13 1.089 60.02 13 .974 57.20
Other 14 .778 17.17 14 .726 40.72 14 .774 49.90
Checking
Virtual 21 .919 61.57 20 .972 57.52 20 .915 51.69
Other 7 .771 43.02 7 .669 42.05 7 .749 58.39
Balancing
Partial 20 .929 65.79 19 1.005 56.70 19 .951 58.45
Full 8 .822 20.25 8 .693 51.21 8 .718 34.66
Note: k = number of studies; g = Hedges’ g; I2 = index of heterogeneity.
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Fig. C1. Funnel plots of Standard Error by Hedges’ g for
confidence, vividness, detail and accuracy.
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